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Abstract
Rapid economic growth in emerging market countries makes them the largest
current source of Green House Gas (GHG) increases. The author has developed
cost-benefit models for the World Bank and client countries to analyze project
portfolios for abating or mitigating GHGs, including the first major study in
China (1992–1994) shortly after the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was
formed and more recent studies in Mexico (2007–2009) and Colombia (2011–
2012). This article uses these studies to explain that all such portfolios have some
projects in which non-GHG benefits exceed total costs, resulting in net negative
costs for reducing GHGs via those particular options. This article shows that
some of these negative cost projects are true projects, while others are not. Instead,
some are pure technologies that are not implementable because of inadequate
identification of market barriers. Still others are chimera—neither one thing nor
another—that have too few attributes of a true project to be implementable. This
* William A. Ward holds a Ph.D. from Michigan State University and is a professor of
economics at Clemson University. He has held senior positions at the World Bank, serves as costbenefit expert to the World Bank Inspection Panel, and has co-written project analysis guidelines
for five countries and three international organizations. He has analyzed more than one hundred
investment operations in more than forty countries and has authored or co-authored three
books and dozens of articles on economic analysis of policies and projects. He also is the author
of a forthcoming book on cost-benefit analysis of energy efficiency projects and low-emission
development strategies.
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article develops a fourth project form called “meta-interventions” in which market
barriers and market failures are identified so that mechanisms can be designed
which make markets work better, leading free market activity to better support
reducing GHGs. Institutional and organizational change will be an important
aspect of meta-interventions, which will demand cadres of lawyers trained to
work with economists, engineers, and other professionals.

Introduction
This article focuses on studies in China (1992–1994), Mexico (2007–2009),
and Colombia (2011–2012) that applied cost-benefit analysis (CBA) methods
to low-emissions development strategies (LEDS) for rapidly-growing, emergingmarket countries.1 This article draws lessons from those studies and uses them to
lay out core principles for identifying market-facilitating, public sector activities—
in particular, those designed to improve energy efficiency (EE) and to abate or
mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Identifying public interventions that
improve EE and reduce GHG emissions is important because evidence from LEDS
studies reveals substantial scope for improvement. Of particular importance in
achieving the needed improvements will be the meta-interventions 2 that improve
the environment for markets to spontaneously find solutions to EE and GHG
problems and to do so without further public sector involvement.
This article advocates for meta-interventions by presenting four related
points. First, substantial opportunities for EE and GHG improvement exist in the
form of negative cost (a.k.a. no regrets and win-win)3 alternatives to business-asusual (BAU) technologies and procedures. But many alternatives that have been
identified as negative cost options in LEDS studies are false options. These false
options occur in two forms—as naked technologies, and as chimera, introduced
into the LEDS literature via this article—which should not be allowed to cloud
the work that needs to be done in substituting meta-interventions in place of these
two forms of project imposters in LEDS planning. Second, there is substantial
1
The author designed the cost-benefit methods used in these three studies (as well as a
number of similar studies in other countries) and supervised the training and the research conducted
by the sector analysts (forty-eight sector experts in China, forty-nine in Mexico, and twenty-two
in Colombia).

“Meta” is a word (commonly used as a prefix) of Classical origin—used both in ancient
Greece and in ancient Rome—that in modern usage has widely differing meanings in each of the
sciences. The author introduces it in combination with intervention to form a new term for use
in the context of LEDS portfolio analysis to mean “more comprehensive or fundamental.” Metainterventions, as this new term defines them, are underrepresented on GHG Marginal Abatement
Cost (MAC) curves, while “naked technologies,” and “chimera” are overrepresented in the MAC
curve juxtaposition with true “projects.” This article uses the term “projects” as proxy for all three of
the regular (i.e., not meta-) interventions (projects, programs, and policies).
2

These terms are used interchangeably in referring to cost-effectiveness calculations of
projects, programs or policies to improve energy efficiency, abate greenhouse gas emissions, or
sequester gasses already emitted.
3
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variety in not only the nature of the real negative cost options, but also in the
physical and socio-cultural environments that produce them. The third point of
this article explains that substantial variation in causes and outcomes means that
EE and GHG problems in differing countries cannot be solved by the standard
approach of identifying one-size-fits-all projects to be replicated time-after-time
and in place-after-place. The fourth point concludes that the LEDS interventions
must solve the market failure and policy failure problems and remove the market
barriers that lead to energy inefficiency and GHG emissions by allowing markets
to work better. If EE and GHG problems are to be resolved, it will not occur
by direct production interventions. Instead, well-functioning markets that use
energy efficiently and do not emit large volumes of GHGs will be required if these
two problems are to be resolved.
The article develops the concept of meta-interventions that involve identifying
the market-making activities and designing the projects to implement them.
Taking this proposed new approach of focusing LEDS upon meta-interventions
will require relatively large cadres of lawyers, engineers, and economists working
together to combine a broad range of understanding of not only technologies but
also law, markets, and institutions.4 The objective of this article is to introduce
lawyers to the concept of meta-interventions and to the kind of training they
will need in order to become active participants in emerging applications in
sustainable development.

Lesson One: Win-Win Options Are For Real . . . Sometimes
Win-win projects in EE and GHG abatement are defined as those projects
that meet the stated EE or GHG objective while also being fully compensated by
other positive impacts that typically are called “co-benefits.” Co-benefits can be
“private,” “social,” or both and can include both private income from related sales
by project implementers and reductions in other forms of negative externalities
(public) such as sulfur dioxide (SO2) or particulate matter.
Negative cost EE options were identified on a large scale by a study of EE
and GHG emissions in China (the China study)5 conducted as the first major
LEDS research project after the GEF was established in 1991. The China study
was funded by the GEF and the World Bank and was carried out during 1992.
In New Institutional Economics (NIE), “institutions” are defined as societal rules
governing human interactions. “Informal” institutions arise from cultural mores and traditions.
“Formal” institutions commonly are codified—explicitly (as in Napoleonic law) or implicitly (as
in the common law)—into the legal structures of their respective societies. See Douglass North,
Institutions, 5 J. Econ. Persp., no. 1, 1991 at 97.
4

5
See generally William A. Ward et al., Energy Efficiency in China: Case Studies and
Economic Analysis (The World Bank 1994) [hereinafter China Study], available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/05/30/000094946_02
100104010040/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
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The author designed the cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness methods used for the
China study as well as for later studies in Mexico and Colombia. The author also
assisted in designing the cost-effectiveness methods applied in a number of other
EE and GHG studies as well. A number of important lessons were learned from
each of these activities. The first set of lessons relates to methods for setting up and
conducting the CBA and cost-effectiveness (C/E) analysis.6 A forthcoming book
will discuss these lessons and will describe best-practice procedures for conducting
similar studies in the future.7
The second set of lessons relates to the project development process itself.
Direct involvement in designing and conducting the studies in China, Mexico,
and Colombia—combined with meta-analysis of comparable LEDS research
conducted by other scholar practitioners—leads to a number of additional lessons
regarding the identification and design of the interventions that make up the
LEDS portfolios being pursued in an increasing number of large and rapidlygrowing emerging market countries. Of all the LEDS studies undertaken, the
industrial EE component of the China study—the first of these studies—provided
the greatest surprises and largest number of valuable learning experiences.8
The China study began with a number of standard assumptions that grew
naturally out of environmental economics 9 models and out of models for dealing
with prices that are distorted by inappropriate government policies.10 The most
important of those presumptions were that GHGs occurred as externalities11
and that the producer of the externalities sought to maximize firm or individual
income (even though that behavior may have imposed external costs upon other
citizens). That first presumption led to a second presumption that reducing GHG
production would involve higher costs (internalizing the externalities) borne by
the producer of the externalities.

6
C/E analysis is a form of CBA in which the objective functions (benefits) are left in
unvalued quantitative units and the cost-per-unit is then compared between alternatives. In LEDS
applications, the C/E analysis measures the cost per tonne of CO2 equivalent abated or mitigated by
each project compared to its alternative or business-as-usual case.

See generally William A. Ward, Robert P. Taylor & Todd M. Johnson, Economic
Analysis of Energy Efficiency Projects and Low-Emission Development Portfolios (The
World Bank forthcoming 2012 or 2013).
7

8

See generally China Study, supra note 5.

The standard reference is Tom Tietenberg and Lynne Lewis, Environmental Economics
Policy (6th ed. 2009). Externalities are costs borne by individuals outside the accounting
stance of the firm or the individual responsible for producing the GHGs.
9

and

10

See William A. Ward & Barry J. Deren, The Economics of Project Analysis: A Prac
Guide (1991).

titioners’

11
Pigou is generally credited with introducing the concept of “externalities” and its
accompanying term. See generally A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1920). See also
James M. Buchanan & W. C. Stubblebine, Externality, 29 Economica, no. 116, 1962, at 371–74
(explaining the concept of externalities).
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The industrial EE component of the China study analyzed opportunities to
improve energy-use efficiency in twenty-five manufacturing industries throughout
the country. The study began with three expectations. First, it would be more
profitable to the industrial enterprises to emit high levels of GHGs than not to
emit those same levels (the normal case presumed in environmental economics
models, as outlined above).12 Thus, the study constructed financial accounts to
reflect the “enterprise only” perspective to facilitate comparisons between private
financial accounts and societal economic accounts. Second, it was expected that
the above financial accounts would be incorrect in terms of “real” (economic)
values because of price distortions that remained from the heritage of formerlyplanned economy (FPE) central planning.13 Thus, the author also designed models
that would substitute economic values (economic shadow prices) in the enterprise
accounts and the related project accounts for the twenty-five energy-efficiency
projects. This second form of analysis was termed “economic analysis.” Third, it
would be necessary to further correct the above economic values by costing the
non-GHG environmental externalities associated with energy use 14 that would
be lessened as a co-benefit of the EE projects.15 This third form of project and
enterprise analysis was termed “environmental economic analysis.”
The above three expectations allowed the calculation of three internal rates of
return for each industrial EE project: (1) a financial internal rate of return (FIRR);
(2) an economic internal rate of return (EIRR); and finally, (3) an environmental
economic internal rate of return (EEIRR).16 The beginning assumption was
that each of the EEIRRs would exceed its respective EIRR simply because the
only difference would be the co-benefits from reducing the GHG-associated
pollutants.17 This logical assumption turned out to be correct.
The relationship between the EIRRs and their respective FIRRs, on the other
hand, was not easy to predict. Some of the price distortions affecting the difference
between FIRR and EIRR would benefit the finances of one particular enterprise
or individual while harming the finances of another. For example, subsidized
steel prices would benefit industries that use steel intensively while reducing the
competitiveness of industries that produce equipment made from materials other
12

See China Study, supra note 5.

13

Id.

These externalities would include such things as damages from particulate matter, SO2, and
other emissions arising from burning large quantities of high-sulfur, low-quality coal.
14

15

See China Study, supra note 5.

Id. The internal rate of return (IRR) is defined in discounted cash flow analysis as the
interest rate that will make the discounted present value of the benefits equal to the discounted
present value of the costs. It is the highest interest rate that the project could pay and still break even.
If the cash flow values are in financial terms, then the calculated IRR is the FIRR. If the cash flow
values are economic, then the calculated IRR is the EIRR.
16

17

Id.
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than steel. The same would be true of energy prices such as electricity and oil. The
initial expectation was that the act of taking any subsidies off the energy prices
would tend to result in EIRR being greater than FIRR for most of the projects.
That expectation was largely confirmed by the study results. The EIRRs were
higher than the FIRRs, but they were not substantially higher.18

Cases Where Win-Win (No Regrets) is Very Real
Contrary to the ex-ante expectations, the 1992–1994 China study revealed
high FIRRs on potential industrial EE projects. The research team had expected to
find low FIRRs on each project (i.e., lower than the cost of capital). Otherwise, as
the standard environmental economics theory taught, those projects presumably
would have been undertaken already.19 With that standard theory in mind, the
China research team had expected to follow up with a project funded by GEF and
the World Bank to subsidize (incentivize) the projects where the FIRR was low
but the EEIRR was high.
Finding that the FIRRs already exceeded the cost of capital in China
undermined the project concept of incentivizing the financial returns on projects
where low FIRRs were paired with high EEIRRs. The high FIRRs suggested that
sufficient incentives already were present. A major research finding was that there
were financially profitable investments in the industrial sector of China that were
available and not being undertaken.20
Twenty-three of the twenty-five industrial EE projects analyzed in the China
study showed negative costs in private financial terms for each tonne of GHG
reduction.21 It was not necessary to add the social benefits of GHG reduction to
those twenty-three project accounts in order to justify investing in the projects.
The high FIRRs and negative private costs described above surprised the
designers of the China study. The follow-up analysis 22 identified several reasons
18
China already had begun the market liberalization process that would bring financial prices
into much closer alignment with real economic values, though serious distortions continue via
an exchange rate for the renminbi that is seriously undervalued and via relaxed enforcement of
environmental regulations. Barry Eichengreen & Hui Tong, The External Impact of China’s Exchange
Rate Policy: Evidence from Firm Level Data (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/11/155, 2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11155.pdf; see also Zhichao Zhang, Real Exchange
Rate Misalignment in China: An Empirical Investigation, 29 J. Comp. Econ., no. 1, 2001, at 80–94.

Neoclassical economic theory teaches that, if there had been any $10 bills on the sidewalk
then the bills would have been picked up. See Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a
New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. Econ. Persp., no. 4, 1995, at
97–98 (discussing a new paradigm of international competitiveness).
19

20

See China Study, supra note 5.

21

See id.

This additional step in the analysis was conducted by the author and included in the report
as Section VII of Part 1 of the China report. See id.
22
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companies failed to implement EE projects that would have saved much more
money than they cost. First, the rapid growth rates in China exacerbated the
capital shortages. Companies would invest in projects that increased output,
but they would not invest in projects that simply reduced costs.23 The solution
was to provide them with technologies that did both. Second, project financing
institutions have the same bias. These institutions are accustomed to lending
for output and revenue expansion but are unaccustomed to lending for cost
saving projects.24 Third, while some of the EE projects were very small (electric
motors, for example) in comparison to the enterprise as a whole and, thus, were
not able to attract management’s attention, they had very high rates of return
on investment.25

Negative Cost and the General Principle of Structure and Increment
While the author identified several more factors affecting specific industries,
the most profound lesson came from the following observation. Generally, the
projects with the highest rates of return on investment were designed for the
enterprises that were the most poorly managed. From this experience, the author
postulates in this article the general principle of structure and increment which
states that the ex-ante rate of return on an efficiency-oriented project will be
inversely related to the efficiency of the enterprise within which the project is
to be implemented.26 The more inefficiently managed the enterprise, the greater
the opportunity to find efficiency-improving projects in that enterprise. The
same is true in macroeconomic management terms: the more poorly managed
the country, the more likely one is to find large numbers of high-return projects
in that country. The same principle holds for enterprises and for countries, each
of which constitutes the structure in the structure-increment analogy. The major
reason for the prevalence of negative cost (a.k.a. high return) projects in the
industrial sector of China was that the sector had been managed very inefficiently
for a long time.27
23

See id.

See generally Robert P. Taylor et al., Financing Energy Efficiency: Lessons from China,
India, Brazil and Beyond (2008) (describing several case studies to suggest a new model for energy
efficiency retrofits).
24

25

See China Study, supra note 5, at xi.

Though the general principle stated in this article grew originally from the China research,
it is not clearly formulated as such in that write-up. Later work makes clear that such statements
as the following imply a more general principle to be applied in the identification of projects and
meta-interventions: “Enterprise viability is a project financing issue for the state enterprises analyzed
by the present study. This implies that an analysis that looks beyond model project analyses is
in order in assessing possible GEF financing of these energy efficiency improvements. . . . These
non-viable enterprises can be left for structural reform programs, which—this analysis further
suggests—probably should be the primary focus in dealing with inefficient state enterprises.” Id. at
Part 1, ¶ 7.25.
26

27

Id.
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Barry Tunnah, the leader of the engineering consultants employed to
identify the technology alternatives in the China study, was not surprised by the
results described above.28 He replied that engineers were encountering negative
cost options for EE on a regular basis in the industrial sectors of not only the
developing and emerging market countries but also in industrialized countries
such as the United States.
The fundamental question of why the win-win options in EE and GHG
abatement are frequently not implemented became the subject of Operational
Program Number 5 Barriers to Energy Efficiency issued in the mid-1990s by the
GEF.29 The question of win-win options and the related quest to identify barriers
to market efficiency became core topics in EE and LEDS programs in the 1990s
and spawned vibrant debates that have waxed and waned but have never gone
away completely, as indicated by Jaccard:
During the oil price crisis of the 1970s, many energy
technologists and efficiency advocates argued that great
improvements in energy efficiency are economically efficient, a
win-win that would increase profits while reducing energy use.
Many economists, however, disputed this claim, arguing that
analysis indicating the existence of profitable opportunities for
energy efficiency must be overlooking some real, but perhaps
intangible, costs for consumers and firms. . . . The McKinsey
(2007) consulting firm has contributed to the [resurgence of
this] issue by producing recent estimates of energy efficiency
profitability for the United States and other countries, estimates
which imply that substantial reductions of GHG emissions
could be realized at little or no cost. Policy-makers who want
to reduce GHG emissions are understandably attracted to this
Mr. Tunnah is a well-known expert in industrial EE who has provided advisory services in
China and a number of other countries for more than three decades for the World Bank and other
clients. In a series of conversations both in the field and while compiling and analyzing data in
Washington and Clemson, Mr. Tunnah pointed out that industrial engineers were accustomed to
businesses making choices that seemed uneconomic when viewed solely in energy efficiency terms.
These conversations preceded the GEF OP5 statement on “barriers to energy efficiency” which had
been preceded by the works of C. B. Blumstein, et al., Overcoming Social and Institutional Barriers to
Energy Efficiency, 5 Energy 355, 355–72 (1980); and Kenneth Train, Discount Rates in Consumers’
Energy-Related Decisions: A Review of the Literature, 10 Energy 1243, 1243–53 (1985). Meanwhile,
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman already were demonstrating seemingly-irrational behavior
by consumers (and businesses) in seminal works in the emerging field of behavioral economics,
for which Kahneman would later receive a Nobel Prize in Economic Science. See Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. of Bus. S251, S251–S278
(1986); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 Science 453, 453–58 (1981).
28

Global Env’t Facility, Operational Program Number 5: Removal of Barriers to
Energy Efficiency and Energy Conservation, available at http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.
org/files/documents/document/OP_5_English.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
29
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analysis as it suggests that such reductions may be cheap and
easy. However, for energy analysts aware of the history of this
debate, it’s déjà vu all over again.30
In conclusion, negative cost options do exist. Some options appearing in
GHG MAC curves, however, are incorrectly presented as such. Many of the real
negative cost opportunities arise because the social benefits that are unaccounted
for in the private financial analysis are larger than the private costs. Many of the
false negative cost options, on the other hand, purport to present private benefits
that exceed the private costs, as was the case in the China industrial EE projects
discussed above.
The transport improvement options that were analyzed in Mexico 31 and
Colombia 32 involved important co-benefits—some of which were social and
some of which were unexpressed private benefits (discussed further, below). In the
absence of substantial co-benefits, the projects would be expected to have positive
C/E ratios and would be arrayed above the horizontal (zero cost) axis in the related
MAC diagram, indicating that each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)
abatement via those options would come at a positive real cost.33 In addition
to reducing energy use and reducing GHG emissions, however, many of the
transport projects also provide social co-benefits via reductions in emissions of
health-damaging pollutants such as SO2 and particulate matter.34 Moreover, some
of the transport options also provide substantial additional private co-benefits
from time-savings accruing to passengers.35 Because the combined private and
social co-benefits sometimes exceed the total cost of the transport improvement,
a part of the GHG reduction objective can be achieved at negative net (social or

30
Mark Jaccard, Paradigms of Energy Efficiency’s Cost and their Policy Implications: Déjà Vu
All Over Again, in Modeling the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation: Summary of a
Workshop 42, 42 (2011).
31
Todd M. Johnson et al., Low-Carbon Development for Mexico (The World Bank 2009),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/ Resources/Medec_final_Oct15_2009_
Eng.pdf.

The official report on the Colombia study is in the process of being drafted and is expected
to be available for general distribution by the World Bank in late 2012 or early 2013. Individual
cost-benefit analyses are on file and available from the author (hereinafter Individual CostBenefit Analyses).
32

33

See infra figs. 1 & 2.

Luis Sanchez Catano et al., MEDEC: Reporte Final–Sector Transporte (CTS-Mexico and
EMBARQ-WRI Working Paper, 2008) (on file with author).
34

35
Note the importance in the CBA of not double-counting the time saved by riders by adding
to the CBA accounts their willingness-to-pay for the time savings if that value already is reflected in
higher fares paid.
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economic) costs per tonne of CO2e abatement via some of the projects that go
into the MAC portfolio.36
Figure 1. GHG Marginal Abatement Cost Curve for Mexico 37
net mitigation benefits

net mitigation costs
100

50

0

50

100

($/t CO2e)
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36
The GHG abatement options that occur below the horizontal axis in the MAC figure
represent the so-called win-win options. Those above the horizontal axis have remaining costs after
consideration of co-benefits. Some projects have no co-benefits to account for. No doubt, some
co-benefits—including, perhaps, some negative “co-benefits”—remain unaccounted for in some of
the interventions, as suggested by various economists. Adrien Vogt-Schilb & Stéphane Hallegatte,
When Starting with the Most Expensive Option Makes Sense: Use and Misuse of Marginal Abatement
Cost Curves (World Bank Sustainable Dev. Network, Working Paper No. 5803, 2011).
37

Johnson et al., supra note 31.
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McKinsey & Company Global MAC Curve for GHG Abatement 		
Potential (2007) 38
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Global cost curve for greenhouse gas abatement measures beyond ‘business as usual’: greenhouse gases measured in GtCO2e1
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1

GtCO2 e = gigaton of carbon dioxide equivalent; “business as usual” based on emissions growth driven mainly by increasing
demand for energy and transport around the world and by tropical deforestation.
2
tCO2 e = ton of carbon dioxide equivalent.
3
Measures costing more than 40 a ton were not the focus of this study.
4
Atmospheric concentration of all greenhouse gases recalculated into CO2 equivalents; ppm = parts per million.
5
Marginal cost of avoiding emissions of 1 ton of CO2 equivalents in each abatement demand scenario.
1

The McKinsey GHG MAC curve (Figure 2) shows numerous win-win
opportunities in not only electricity, but also in other GHG abatement and
mitigation programs. This is similar to other MAC curves generated from a range
of approaches that were pigeon-holed by Kesicki into the following groupings: 39
(1) Model-based MAC curves, including (a) top-down models built by economists,
and (b) bottom-up models built by engineers and technologists; and (2) Expertbased MAC curves, also built primarily by engineers and technologists.

Per-Anders Enkvist, Tomas Nauclér, & Jerker Rosander, A Cost Curve for Greenhouse Gas
Reduction, The McKinsey Q., no. 1, 2007, at 35–45, Exhibit I.
38

Fabian Kesicki, Marginal Abatement Cost Curves for Policy Making–Expert-Based vs. ModelDerived Curves (June 2010) (unpublished student paper, University College London), available at
http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~ucft347/Kesicki_MACC.pdf.
39
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It is Important to Distinguish between Private and Social Win-Win Options
The McKinsey and Company global MAC curve for GHG abatement
demonstrates the global nature of win-win presumptions.40 Among the no
regrets options appearing in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the options involving social
co-benefits (a.k.a. externalities, such as the SO2 referred to previously) are readily
explainable—they occur as true externalities that are difficult to internalize
into regular market transactions. These options represent pure examples of
Pigouvian externalities.41
A second kind of win-win option, on the other hand, for which the co-benefits
come in the form of private gains accruing to the same individuals who bear the cost
of the respective option, are more problematic.42 These are problematic because
the net private costs are negative, as indicated by the FIRRs that exceeded the
cost of capital. Thus, the failure to implement more energy efficient technologies
seems illogical in the absence of extenuating circumstances, such as the structureincrement principle, capital shortages, or small projects relative to enterprise
management capacity, as outlined above. Still others will sometimes contain the
implementation solution within the CBA itself, such as improved bus services
in Mexico and Colombia, where the externality of passenger time savings might
readily have been captured (i.e., internalized) via a bus fare increase.43 The simple
answer in this third case is to use the CBA as a market study to determine bus
fare adjustments reflective of service improvements to be provided by the project,
and thus to turn the (social) win-win public service project into a straightforward
market transaction between the travelers and the bus company.
The three forms of analysis used in the China study allowed the analysts
to conclude that economists should distinguish between private win-win
options versus social win-win options. The China study was conducted with the
expectation of finding options that were win-win in social terms but not in private
terms. As such, economists expected the need to subsidize private behavior to
achieve social objectives. Instead, the China study revealed that there were both
social and private win-win options. As a result, in the later studies in Mexico,
Colombia, and other countries, the team began redesigning the analysis to look
for specific differences between private and social win-wins among the negative
cost options. For the private win-wins, the team began developing methods for
determining whether they were false win-wins because of under-consideration
of non-GHG attributes. In cases where non-GHG attributed reduced the

40

See supra Figure 2.

See generally Harold Demsetz, The Core Disagreement Between Pigou, the Profession, and
Coase in the Analyses of the Externality Question, 12 Eur. J. of Pol. Econ., no. 4, 1996, at 565.
41

42

See China Study, supra note 5.

43

See Johnson et al., supra note 31.
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attractiveness of the lower-emissions alternative, sector experts were instructed to
seek (design) alternatives that provide the fuller range of attributes sought by users
of the technology. In cases where the barrier is outside the product itself and is in
the market, then those false win-wins might be convertible into true win-wins by
identifying and designing meta-interventions that remove the market barriers and
market failures impeding the development of those options.
Beyond the impact on the design of the CBA approaches in Mexico and
Colombia, the above conclusions led to dropping the GEF proposal to subsidize
differences between financial and economic returns. Instead, the GEF focused on
identifying the meta-interventions in China needed to correct the market barriers
and market failures impeding rational market behavior. A number of World
Bank and GEF projects and programs followed, including training programs for
energy service company (ESCO) executives coupled with assistance in forming
an association of ESCOs,44 financial sector loans targeted at financing EE,45 etc.
The World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (now the Independent
Evaluation Group) report on the Bank’s program in China concludes that:
With none of 20 completed projects rated unsatisfactory and
only one of the 19 ongoing projects rated a problem project, the
performance of the China energy portfolio is without equal. . . .
[A]ll [projects] shared a strong emphasis on technology transfer
and capacity building. Projects were targeted to a few selected
sector institutions and geared to maximize their demonstration
effect to the rest of the sector, particularly in terms of the benefits to
be derived from modern technology and management methods,
international procurement, and resettlement approaches.
. . . This approach had extremely successful outcomes, the sector
made remarkable progress in assimilating new technologies and
technical skills, and increasing efficiency of project management
and operation. The latter was critical to China’s ability to
rapidly expand energy supply in order to sustain a booming
economy. . . . [T]he institutional development impact of the
Bank’s program for this initial period is thus rated substantial.
These early physical and institutional achievements were fully
sustainable and, indeed, paved the way for the more ambitious

44
Robert P. Taylor, Achieving Sustainability in World Bank Energy Efficiency Projects: Lessons
Learned Developing ESCOs in China, 29 Strategic Planning for Energy and the Env’t, no. 1
(2009) at 32–41.

The list of related project documents of World Bank energy efficiency financing loans
to China can be seen at http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P084874/china-energy-efficiencyfinancing?lang=en.
45
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policy reforms of the mid- and late 1990s. The performance
of the Bank is rated fully satisfactory, particularly for the solid
technical advice and support it provided in the context of project
preparation and implementation. . . .46
One of the important lessons drawn from the activities that followed the China
study was that
Internal Bank factors are critical to building up and sustaining an
effective long-term sector dialogue. The Bank’s successes in power,
energy efficiency, and renewables in China have much to do with
staff continuity, the high caliber of individual task managers, the
existence of a dedicated pool of expertise on specialized aspects,
and management’s willingness to invest resources in quality,
highly participatory sector work.47
A number of analysts pay insufficient attention to the distinction between
social win-wins and private win-wins. Accordingly, they tend to argue over
the logic of win-wins projects, with some going so far as to totally deny their
existence. In the work reported by Jaccard that is focused upon electricity sector
demand-side management (DSM) and related issues, private win-win options are
the primary concern.48 Naturally, these private win-win options also draw the
attention of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theorists who cannot imagine
that individuals would ignore money-saving options, unless the transaction
costs were higher than the apparent net benefits. Most of the transport options
in the Mexico and Colombia studies, on the other hand, address alternatives
in which the win-win status is primarily social in nature. The social win-win
factors include true externalities (e.g., health damages from sulfur emissions)
that are difficult and costly to capture or to avoid by private individuals who are
transacting independently.

Private and Social Win-Win Options Can Arise From Policy Failures
Win-win options also exist in cases where policies distort choices that
individuals face. The time savings from improved bus services may well provide
a stellar example falling into this third category. For example, it is altogether

46
Anthony Churchill & Cordula Thum, The Bank’s Assistance to China’s Energy Sector 1–2
(The World Bank Operations Evaluation Dep’t, No. 32898, 2005), available at http://lnweb90.
worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/8353511BC9753A1185256FF0
0058E8CB/$file/china_cae_energy.pdf.
47

Id. at 2.

48

See generally Jaccard, supra note 30.
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possible for regulated (low) bus fares, unaccompanied by offsetting municipal
budget transfers to the bus company, to prevent a municipal bus service from
implementing win-win options that save passengers time.49 Co-generation
opportunities in refineries—to use waste heat to generate electricity beyond the
refinery’s own internal needs—represent still another option falling into this
third category.50
A fourth category of win-win options includes, simply, opportunities that are
poorly analyzed. The poorly analyzed options lead to MAC curves on which the
projects are not equal in caliber. Some options are exceptionally well-identified and
well-prepared and deserve the title “project.” Others are simply technologies that
have been identified as potential alternatives to continued BAU technologies or
procedures but have not been fully specified as to all their attributes and how these
compare in terms of consumer acceptability. The poorly analyzed options deserve
the title of “naked technologies,” implying that they are less-than-project-quality.
Others are better prepared and do not deserve to be called naked technologies, but
they are not fully-developed projects either. Since these are neither, these deserve
their own name, and the author has chosen to call them “chimera.” Finally, the
fourth category of intervention, that at present is seldom represented on MAC
curves, is the meta-intervention that consists of a fully-developed project that is
focused on removing some barrier to full market functioning or on adding some
institution or mechanism whose absence impedes market functioning.

Lesson Two: Environments Vary As Much As ‘Beliefs’ About TCE
Countries are different in many ways: physically, climate-wise, culturally, etc.
Additionally, their socio-economic institutions differ.51 Thus, the continuation
of the tendency in economic development circles to try to design one-size-fits-all
development projects and programs is remarkable.
Physical differences can lead to institutional differences. Both physical and
institutional differences imply a requirement for specificity in finding solutions to
local problems. Sometimes one size fits all, but often in the economic development

49
Johnson et al., supra note 31, at 65 (providing information from the transport section
of the Mexico study); Individual Cost-Benefit Analyses, supra note 32 (providing the draft C/E
analyses of transport sector options in the on-going Colombia study).
50
Johnson et al., supra note 31, at 38 (providing information from the Mexico study in the
section on “Co-Generation in PEMEX”).
51
See North, supra note 4, at 99–102 (discussing the effect of economic development on
different societies); Douglass North, Econ. Historian, Wash. U., St. Louis, Nobel Prize Lecture:
Economic Performance Through Time (Dec. 9, 1993) (transcript available at http://www.
nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html).
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process it does not. In economic development projects, unlike commercial bank
projects, replication of the same model seldom works well.
The United States’ reputed love affair with personal freedom involving big
cars, spread-out living arrangements, and long drives is evidenced by its high fossil
fuel and energy use in comparison to the other countries listed.52 In Colombia,
by contrast, extensive rainforests, related land-use conversion, and heavy use of
hydroelectric generation (two-thirds of the overall capacity in its electric power
production system) contribute to a vastly different EE/GHG profile compared
not only to that of the United States, but also compared to China and Mexico.53
Brazil appears as a caricature of the South American profile hinted by Colombia
and, thus, stands in even starker contrast to the United States’ GHG profile.54
All of the countries mentioned above have played important roles in the EE and
GHG studies previously conducted and mentioned herein.55
While the United States, Mexico, and China generate more than two-thirds
of their GHG emissions from fossil fuel combustion, Colombia generates only
slightly more than one-third of its GHGs from energy generation and use.56
Meanwhile, the caricatured country, Brazil, generates only 17% of its GHGs from
fossil fuel combustion.57 These differences are highlighted in Figures 3–7, below
(each drawing from a different but reasonably comparable data source).

Energy Info. Admin., DOE/EIA-0573 (2001), U.S. Dep’t of Energy: Emissions of
Greenhouse Gasses in the United States 2001 1–12 (2002) [hereinafter DOE Emissions Study].
52

53
IDEAM, Comunicaciones Nacionales (reported in Dec. 2011, but exact reference date is
not known by the author).
54
Carlos Clemente Cerri et al., Brazilian Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Importance of
Agriculture and Livestock, 66 Sci. Agric., no. 6, 2009, at 831, 840 (rounding figures up accordingly).
55
These countries have played a vital role in those studies; especially when one includes the
work on the book by Robert Taylor et al. See generally Taylor et al., supra note 24.

See Jaccard, supra note 30, at 2 (reporting that “[t]he global energy system is over 80%
dependent on fossil fuels . . .”). Specific percentages for the United States, Mexico, China, and
Colombia are 82%, 70%, 68%, and 37%, respectively. For data sources, see infra Figs. 3–7 and
related notes.
56

57

Cerri et al., supra note 54, at 831, 840.
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Figure 3. USA Sources of GHG Emissions 58
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DOE Emissions Study, supra note 52 (rounding values up or down accordingly).

59

Id.
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Figure 4. Mexico Sources of GHG Emissions 60
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Figure 5. China Sources of GHG Emissions (2005) 61
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60
José Luis Luege Tamago [Sec. Env’t. & Nat. Resources] et al., National Greenhouse Gas
Inventory 1990 –2002 (Report of Mexico: Executive Summary).
61
IDEAM, Comunicaciones Nacionales, Presentation by Departmento Nacional de
Planeacion (Sept. 26, 2011), in Colombia Low Emission Development Strategy.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol12/iss2/4

18

Ward: Roles for Legal Scholarship in the Design of Meta-Interventions f

2012

Law and GHG Management Projects

357

Figure 6. Colombia Sources of GHG Emissions 62
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Cerri et al., supra note 54, at 831, 840 (rounding values up or down accordingly); Jane A.
Leggett, Jeffrey Logan, & Anna Mackey, Cong. Research Serv., RL34659, China’s Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Mitigation Policies (2008) (using data provided to CRS by U.S. IEA and rounding
values up or down accordingly).
63
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Figure 7. Brazil Sources of GHG Emissions (2005) 64
Waste
1%

Fossil Fuel
Combustion
17%

LULULF
56%

Fugitive
Emissions
1%
Industry
2%

Enteric
Fermentation
12%
Other
Agriculture
11%

N.B.: LULUCF stands for land use, land-use change, and forestry.
The cogent points in this section relate to: (1) the differing sources of the GHGs
from country-to-country, with energy playing a large but dissimilar role in each
case; and (2) the differing sources of the energy itself—with fossil fuels playing
a large role in United States electric power but only a minor role in Colombia
electric power, for example.65
Land use, land-use conversion, and forestry (LULUCF) and agriculture uses
account for approximately 52% of GHG emissions in Colombia, where rain
forest destruction, inefficient agricultural production, and methane-emitting
livestock (primarily enteric fermentation from cattle) constitute the basic sources
of GHG emissions.66 In Mexico and China, the LULUCF and agriculture sources
account for less than 15% of GHG emissions, and in the United States they
are not mentioned in the main accounting.67 The figure for Brazil (keeper of

64
Cerri et al., supra note 54, at 831, 840 (rounding values up or down accordingly); Leggett,
Logan, & Mackey, supra note 63.
65

France (not discussed here) gets 80% of her electric power from nuclear.

66

See supra Figs. 3–7.

67

Id.
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the largest segment of the Amazon rain forests) shows that almost 80% of its
GHG emissions come from the non-energy combination of LULUCF (56%),
agriculture other than livestock (11%), and livestock (12%, primarily enteric
fermentation). Meanwhile, only 17% of Brazil’s GHG emissions come from fossil
fuel combustion.68
Juxtaposing Colombia’s 37% (and caricaturing Brazil’s 17%) against the
United States’ 82% fossil fuel combustion figure for GHG sources highlights the
country-by-country differences of Lesson Two. Thus, in spite of the large role
played in South America, Africa, and India by agriculture, forestry and LULUCF, 69
the U.S. Energy Information Administration can nevertheless confidently report
that “[d]uring the past [twenty] years, about three-quarters of human-made
carbon dioxide emissions [globally] were from burning fossil fuels.” 70
The foregoing discussion 71 reveals that the GHG issue is divisible into three
segments. Segment one addresses energy-related GHG emissions and the role
played by both production 72 and consumption73— with the latter commonly (but
not always) providing most of the emissions. Segment two addresses land-use
conversion and forest destruction, particularly in the tropics where LULUCF
tends to dominate the GHG emissions. Segment three addresses a mixture of
other GHG sources and possible fixes.74 Segment three elements dominate in no
single country but are present everywhere. Even within the energy-related sources
of GHGs,75 there is great variety both within and between countries.76

68

See Cerri et al., supra note 54, at 831.

This led their representatives at the November–December 2011 U.N. Conference on
Climate Change in Durban, South Africa, to object strenuously to inclusion of agriculture in
climate change discussions. Interview with Todd M. Johnson, Lead Energy Specialist for Latin
America and Caribbean, World Bank (Jan. 10, 2012).
69

70
Greenhouse Gasses, Climate Change and Energy, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.
gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapter1.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
71
These examples are sufficient to make the points made in this article, without lengthening
the discussion with complementary studies and analyses conducted by the author.
72

This includes the extraction, transportation, and conversion processes.

This includes the use of energy for household heating and cooling, transportation fuels,
and industrial fuels and feedstocks.
73

74
This category incudes, for example, fugitive emissions from gas-line leaks and methane
production by solid waste landfills.
75

Energy-related sources are already agreed to constitute 75% of total GHG emissions.

A major thesis of this article is that variation within the Americas alone is sufficient to
establish the central point being made here. Note that comparisons of GHG sources in the Americas
with those in Africa add new dimensions to the illustration of variety. See, e.g., Ivan Tomaselli, Forests
and Energy in Developing Countries, (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), Working Paper No. 2, 2007), available at http://www.fao.org/forestry/13444-0874bf0443b
27425a28a3a2f706ad5362.pdf.
76
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Variety can increase the conceptual and practical difficulties associated with
externalities 77 and, thus, with one of the more misused and misunderstood
concepts in economics: the economics of transaction costs (TCE).78 Transaction
costs are accused of not only causing or complicating the problem of externalities,
but also of affecting the vision of those who would seek to attack such perceived
problems. The remaining task is to find, within the vastly differing environments
described above, creative ways to combine deeper understanding of NIE and
TCE with the very specific organizational and institutional knowledge that
results from diversity as those factors relate to individual markets for energy and
for non-energy products that produce GHG externalities as co-products. Again,
the central theme of this article is that using combinations of knowledge and
creativity to identify and define meta-interventions needs to play a much bigger
role in LEDS planning and in developing the resulting MAC portfolios. These
meta-interventions commonly will be designed to create markets or to make
existing markets work better.

Lesson Three: True and False Win-Wins Have Logical Explanations
The distinction between naked technologies, chimera, true projects, and
meta-interventions explains some of the no regrets options that commonly appear
on MAC curves alongside the low-cost, mid-cost, and high-cost options for GHG
abatement. For example, some of the no regrets options on the MAC curves are
simply technologies (such as co-generation with waste heat from industry). They
will not be adopted (or will be limited to electricity generation for intra-plant use
by industry) until associated projects or other interventions such as net metering
practices by electric power companies or (model) power purchase agreements
(PPAs) are developed and implemented. Net metering regulations, model-power
purchase agreements, and investments in grid technologies that allow co-generated
power to feed into the grid represent excellent examples of the meta-interventions
discussed in this article.
The potential candidates for the category of technologies that are not
yet projects can be identified from Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1 (Mexico),
the candidates are non-motorized transport (e.g., bicycles), road freight
logistics, co-generation in Pemex (Petróleos Mexicanos),79 residential lighting,

77
Defined long ago by A. C. Pigou as “a divergence between private and social costs.” See
generally Pigou, supra note 11.
78
See Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & Econ. 141, 141–42 (1979)
(describing the effect of externalities upon transaction costs).
79
Petroleum refining creates waste heat, part of which is recycled internally for other uses in
the refinery. Also, oil wells often release associated gas that could be used in electricity generation
rather than being flared. Regulations prohibiting Pemex from selling electricity not used internally
contribute to energy inefficiency and foregone opportunities to reduce GHG emissions elsewhere
in the electricity system. See Johnson et al., supra note 31.
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non-residential lighting, charcoal production, industrial motors, zero-tillage
maize, co-generation in industry, solar water-heating, forest management, nonresidential air conditioning, residential refrigeration, gas leakage reduction,
residential air conditioning, bio-mass electricity generation, and improved cook
stoves. In Figure 2 (McKinsey, global), the candidates are building insulation,
fuel efficiency in commercial vehicles, lighting systems, air-conditioning, water
heating, and industrial non-CO2.
In some cases, the project (intervention) to get a technology widely adopted
may be nothing more than simple information campaigns, as suggested by
Ostertag in her study of high-efficiency electric motors:
Causes that explain the persistence of the idle profitable HEM
[high-efficiency electric motors] investment opportunity relate
to information deficiencies which lead to a collapse of the high
quality (efficiency) end of the motor market. The problem lies in
quality ignorance and ambiguous energy efficiency indications
as well as the problem of ignorance of utility, i.e. of the energy
(cost) savings. The problems are such that autonomous market
solutions necessarily fail, e.g. because HEM qualify as confidence
goods impeding the building up of a good reputation.80
Other interventions shown on MAC curves clearly are technologies that are
superior in fuel efficiency or in GHG efficiency (only) for the simple reason that
the sector analysts have failed to identify options that either meet or exceed all of
the other objectives being pursued simultaneously by the user of the technology.81
Development of the zero-tillage maize option from Figure 1 provides an
instructive example regarding the inclusion of all costs. The LULUCF group in
Mexico asked how to handle the fact that zero-tillage involved tractor services,
while many of the maize farms were too small to justify or afford tractors dedicated
to that farm alone. A basic principle was needed in order to avoid chimera in
which project costs were being ignored. The principle that was developed involved
estimating the costs that would be present no matter how such services were to be
80
Katrin Ostertag, Re-Assessing No-Regret Potentials-The Example of High Efficiency Electric
Motors 315 (Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, 2001), available at http://
www.eceee.org/conference_proceedings/eceee/2001/Panel_2/p2_3/paper.
81
The forthcoming book by Ward, Taylor, and Johnson discusses these “other” objectives as
having dimensions that include: (1) quantity, (2) quality, and (3) temporal aspects. See Ward, Taylor,
& Johnson, supra note 7. The forthcoming book points out that correct use of cost-effectiveness
analysis requires that any option (technology) that is to be included in the MAC analysis must
either meet or exceed all of the foregoing dimensions in comparison with the counterfactual or BAU
technology. Alternatively, any divergences (shortages) between the option and the counterfactual
within these dimensions may be valued as a co-benefit (co-cost) and combined with the direct cost
difference to determine a net cost to go into the bottom of the respective C/E ratio.
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performed. In the tractor services application, this involved first calculating the
levelized costs (including profit at the opportunity cost of capital) and, secondly,
making sure that costs were included in the zero-tillage maize option. In fact, the
full project design to achieve widespread adoption of zero-tillage maize technology
will eventually include other costs as well. Moreover, it might include other
interventions. These might be follow-on projects to eliminate market barriers and
market failures standing between zero-tillage and current maize-growing practices
in Mexico. That matrix of potential interventions is what constitutes meta.

Conclusion: Meta-Interventions
are a Great Idea, but not Easy Work
Meta-interventions focus on the social-economic-institutional environments
in which individuals make technological choices and market decisions. Sometimes,
a meta-intervention is a single-stage activity (project, program, policy) that repairs
a single policy failure, market barrier, or market failure: for example, changing
the policy or law that prevents Pemex (Petróleos Mexicanos) from being in the
electricity supply business.
At other times, a meta-intervention constitutes a multi-project, multi-year
process. For example, overcoming the conflagration of market barriers and market
failures that prevented ESCOs from existing in China has taken nearly twenty
years following the 1992–1994 China Study. 82
Success in creating an ESCO industry in China involved not just one
intervention but, rather, a long list of projects and institutional interventions
ranging from: (1) the emergence of model contracts 83 for energy performance
contracting; to (2) finding creative ways to assure contract fulfillment/enforcement
in the presence of a weak court system; and to (3) creating lines of bank credit for
ESCOs upon which to draw in the absence of well-developed capital markets.84

82
Interview with Robert P. Taylor, Former Senior Energy Economist, The World Bank (Jan.
15, 2012). Mr. Taylor is widely recognized as world’s leading non-Chinese expert on energy issues
in China.
83
Interestingly, the China ESCO performance contracts tend to be ten to fifteen pages in
average length compared to United States ESCO performance contracts that average about sixty
pages in length. Some, but not all, of the difference in numbers of pages is explained by the average
forty percent shrinkage that occurs in moving from English language concepts in Latin script to
Chinese language concepts recorded in Chinese pictographs.
84
Many of the ESCOs to emerge from the second energy crisis in the USA and Canada
developed the capability to re-liquify themselves after each round of energy audits and related
project contracts by then securitizing the resulting performance contracts and selling them into the
well-developed capital markets of the United States. China does not yet have well-developed capital
markets; therefore, ESCO financing still must come via credit lines in the financial market.
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Other meta-projects (a sub-set of meta-interventions) that were involved in
developing the China ESCO industry included activities such as finding experts
from the United States-Canada experiences of the 1980s, and designing training
materials and training activities based on their experience and expertise.
Clearly, some of the above work that identified and designed meta-interventions
will benefit from lawyers who understand both NIE and business practices and
who can put into place legal infrastructure to make markets work. The common
law system is derived from the belief that formal institutions of law should stand
on the shoulders of informal institutions of history and culture, and accordingly,
every institutional environment will be different. To improve the functioning
of markets in a particular environment, not only must these meta-intervention
analysts possess knowledge across a broad front of law, economics, and business,
but these persons will also require extensive knowledge of local history, and local
formal and informal institutions. In addition to these requirements, only the
creative among the best educated will prove adept in productively applying the
foregoing, rare combination of knowledge and ability. Finding and educating
such a cadre is a worthy challenge to be assumed by the legal profession.
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